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Leadership Style and War and Peace Policies in the Context of Armed Conflict
The Case of Maskhadov and Umarov

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The purpose of the present article is to establish what links there may be between leadership styles and war and peace policies in the Russia–Chechen conflict. To do so, we analyze the styles of two unrecognized executive leaders, Aslan Maskhadov and Doku Umarov, both of whom were involved in the same conflict with different peace policies. The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we overview the literature on leadership styles in armed conflict situations and construct a theoretical framework. Second, we review the historical and biographical context. Third, we examine the interview content-analysis methodology for the measuring of leadership style. Fourth, we classify Maskhadov and Umarov on the basis of leadership styles, and compare policies implemented by these leaders with those of other leaders in a context of internal armed conflict. Finally, we present conclusions and future prospects.

INTRODUCTION

In most modern countries, politics focuses increasingly on the leader and less on political parties; this is due to both the emergence of new media, which tend to focus on individual leaders, and the prominence of international summits, which tend to elevate executive political leaders over other political actors (Garzia 2011; Helms 2012).

American political science has never abandoned leadership as an object of study, but in recent years there has been a general resurgence of publications on this topic. Some of these relate leadership to decision making and overall performance of political systems (Helms 2012). According to Mares and Palmer (2012, 97), “the personal qualities contributed by a head of state [or head of government] to the decision making process can be, and usually are, crucial in determining political outcomes.” Other works more specifically relate leadership to decision making on war and peace in conflict contexts (Burke and Greenstein 1991; Byman and Pollack 2001; Conway et al. 2001, 2003; Mares and Palmer 2012).

The importance of “exceptional personalities” has been stressed in the Russian Federation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The role of President Vladimir Putin in the second Chechen war of the post-Soviet era was crucial in increasing his popularity and strengthening his leadership (Zassoursky 2004; White and McAllister 2008). Several academic studies (Evangelista 2005; White and McAllister 2008; Edwards 2013) have focused on his leadership role in one way or another both within Russia and on the international stage.

Despite the Russian onslaught, however, the Chechens were not subjugated, and one of the factors behind this fact is leadership. Given the material and numerical inferiority of the Chechen rebels in the armed conflict, they required effective leaders to emerge victorious from an unequal fight (Cayias 2012). Therefore, some studies have focused on various Chechen independence leaders such as Dzhokhar Dudayev, Aslan Maskhadov, and Shamil Basayev (ibid.), and pro-Russians such as Ramzan Kadyrov (Kroupeney 2007; Russell 2008). There are no recent studies that specifically address the leadership of the former president of the secessionist Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) and first emir of the Caucasus Emirate (CE), Doku Umarov.

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The main objective of this case study is to establish the links between leadership styles and war and peace policies in the Russian–Chechen conflict. To do so, we analyze the styles of two unrecognized executive leaders, Aslan Maskhadov and Doku Umarov, both of whom were involved in the same conflict with different peace policies. Although both were custodians of the same position of leadership in a formal state organization with hegemony over the Kremlin’s opponents in the region, other hard-to-measure constraints must be taken into account, and analyses must be made for consecutive periods 1997–2005/2006–2014 and not simultaneously. Then, once the first objective has been completed, the aim is to establish hypotheses and variables on the possible impact of leadership styles on war and peace policies implemented by executive, unrecognized, and insurgent leaders in the context of internal armed conflicts; in other words, to prove that there is enough evidence to export the model to different contexts.

This paper will argue in favor of a relationship between the leadership styles of the main actors of the Russian–Chechen conflict and their willingness to implement peace policies, and will conclude that a preventive analysis of their discourses can offer valuable information about the opportunities and disadvantages for conflict resolution. In other words, if the aforementioned analysis had been made in due time, Maskhadov’s inclination toward a sincere political solution to the conflict could have been proved.

The structure of the paper is the following. First, we examine the literature on leadership, leadership styles, and decision making in armed conflict scenarios and define a theoretical framework. Second, we review the historical and biographical context. Third, we present the methodology of interview content analysis to measure leadership styles. Fourth, we classify Maskhadov and Umarov in terms of leadership styles, and compare the policies implemented by these leaders with those of other leaders in a context of internal armed conflicts; in other words, to prove that there is enough evidence to export the model to different contexts. Finally, we present conclusions and future prospects.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, LEADERSHIP STYLES, AND DECISION-MAKING IN CONTEXTS OF ARMED CONFLICT

Political Leadership: Concepts and Approaches

Leadership is a key aspect of political processes but its definition is complex and elusive (Elcock 2001). Difficulties in defining this concept derive from its polysemic and multidisciplinary nature. This article focuses on political leadership, although this term is still very broad and its delimitation is convenient.

There is a vast literature on political leadership marked by the variety of approaches, theories, definitions, typologies, and methodological approaches (a paper that examines and organizes all this theoretical morass is Rivas and Alcántara 2015). Similarly, there are as many definitions of political leadership as papers addressing this phenomenon.

Three approaches to the study of leadership are usually distinguished: the approach of personal traits or characteristics; the positional-contingent approach; and the behavioral approach. The personal traits approach aims to identify the qualities and skills a leader has or needs. The positional-contingent approach takes into account the position of a leader within the environment in which he or she is located and links him or her to the context in which it operates. The behavioral approach is emphasized in analyses of political leaders’ behavior (Natera 2001; Northouse 2001). Another approach that would be suitable for addition to this group is a relational approach, which defines leadership as a phenomenon that is inseparable from the followers’ needs (Burns 2010), a social manifestation of the relationship between the leader and his followers.

Personal Traits and Leadership Style

This paper combines approaches that focus on a leader’s personal traits and his or her behavior. A political leader is understood as the individual who has the authority to allocate resources, determine the objectives of a political unit, and affect its policies (Katz 1973). Personal characteristics are all those aspects stemming from the fact of being an individual; that is, the leader’s biographical statistics (gender, age, birthplace, etc.), training, experience, abilities and skills, motivation, or beliefs and values.

From the standpoint of political psychology, personal characteristics can be profound, like the emotional impulses and basic needs of the individual; or manifest, such as the ability to control the environment, the need to have influence, or the degree of openness to information and motivation. These manifest personal characteristics comprise the leader’s leadership style elements and “have an obvious connection with the behavior” of the latter (Hermann 1977). In contemporary societies, political leaders must face two dilemmas that shape their leadership style and affect their political conduct or behavior: learning how to maintain control over politics, delegating responsibilities or assuming the leading role, and how to shape the political agenda, motivated by problems and/or relationships (Hermann 1999).

The consideration of leadership as style means to define it as an evident personal characteristic of a leader, as determined through analysis of the way language is indicative, to a greater or lesser extent, of their conduct or behavior in a particular political-social and historical context as well as the way he or she has to interact with the environment. The behavior of a political leader is comprised by a set of political decisions he or she makes about a given topic.
The development of studies on leadership styles began in the 1930s. In 1930 Harold Lasswell (1963), based on an analysis of medical records of political leaders, produced two profiles: the administrator, who prioritizes continuous activity and “focuses on abstract objects”; and theagitator, who “allocates a high value to the public response and is strongly narcissist” (ibid., 64, 250–51). In 1939, a group of American scientists led by Kurt Lewin developed a controlled experiment to test the effects of different leadership styles on individuals’ behavior within groups.4

Over time, many other studies of leadership styles emerged, mainly theoretical in nature. The one by James MacGregor Burns (2010) has enjoyed more scientific influence than others since it was first published in 1978. Drawing on Machiavelli’s distinction between a fox and a lion, this author distinguishes two leadership styles: transactional and transformational. In the first one, the relationship between a leader and his or her followers is based on economic, political, or symbolic exchange. Transformational leadership is based on the identification of followers with the leader and the commitment of both to achieve a common goal, and it proliferates in contexts of political change.

One of the main difficulties in the study of political leadership and leadership styles, especially in the so-called central arenas (executive and legislative branches), is the limited access to empirical sources (Helms 2012). In order to overcome this difficulty, some political psychology authors, mainly from Anglo-Saxon countries, have developed works on leadership styles from the Leadership Trait Analysis method (hereinafter LTA). This methodology evaluates leaders’ traits or personal characteristics through analysis of the contents of interviews granted by such leaders to the media. From these characteristics, leadership styles are established. For Hermann (1999, 2) the responses of leaders to these interviews are a relatively spontaneous material.5

Leadership and Decision-Making in Contexts of Armed Conflict

In turbulent contexts of uncertainty, conflict, or political change, leadership emerges more strongly and plays a major role (Zalenik 1977). Executive political leaders often take a greater role and become more decisive. A conflict is a social situation in which two parties simultaneously struggle over the same set of scarce resources (Wallensteen 1988). It is a relationship in which “the claims of the parties are radically confronted and according to the perception of each of the parties only one can impose or prevail over the other” (Merlano and Negret 2006, 16). The opposing parties may indefinitely respond to aggressions or make use of negotiation—a process by which “they voluntarily decide their differences or interests in order to reach a consensual decision on a common subject” (ibid., 25–28, 47).

In addition to negotiation as such, there is a broader range of decisions that a political leader can make in conflict situations within a state. This study distinguishes two main policy groups as a result of a leader’s decision making: peace policies (negotiation), and war policies (confrontation), which will be examined below.

As George (1969) states, the beliefs of a political leader on the nature of politics and political conflicts may be an influencing factor in his or her decisions, but there are a few papers on the relationship between the leadership style of executive leaders and decision making on war and peace policies in contexts of an armed conflict.

One of the most-cited scholars of leadership study, James MacGregor Burns (2010) considers that the specialization of the decision-making process is the essence of executive function and that it has been heavily influenced by the military sector.6 According to this author, it is typical of an executive leader to “concentrate the authority in a position, isolate the decision making against external appeal and reduce the alternatives to yes or no”; further, for this kind of leader there are “sacred and orthodox” political objectives. A greater autonomy of executive leaders to make such decisions is given in a military or armed conflict context, in post-revolutionary situations, or reforming governments (ibid., 379).

Few studies in the field of political science have established a link between leadership style and decision-making in war and peace scenarios, but authors in social disciplines such as international relations and social psychology have published numerous academic papers on this topic.

Byman and Pollack (2001) and Mares and Palmer (2012) address this issue from the perspective of international studies. Byman and Pollack (2001) attest to the impact of individual leaders on state behavior by examining several historical examples and positing a number of “plausible and testable” hypotheses. According to these authors, individual actors play a central role in shaping a state’s foreign policy, including wars, alliances, and peace processes.

From the conflict between Peru and Ecuador (1995–1998), Mares and Palmer (2012) distinguish several leadership types that, along with other structural and institutional factors, help to explain the making of certain types of decisions in a context of armed conflict, such as the use of force. According to Mares and Palmer, “a leader’s organizational and communication skills, as well as his or her vision of creating opportunities for cooperation, can have a significant impact on the conflict” (ibid., 45). These authors consider two qualities of a leader: the ability to innovate and the willingness to take risks. These qualities help to explain “the degree of maneuverability and the possibility to formulate policies that leaders have within the institutional limitations” and serve as criteria for the classification of styles (ibid., 77).
In the field of social psychology, other works discussing the impact of leadership style on political decisions have been based on a variety of analytical techniques, including the above-mentioned LTA. The fundamental stance taken by these studies is that certain aspects of a leader’s personality can influence the decision-making process, especially in foreign policy (Kernberg 1999).

In this sense, Margaret Hermann (1980, 1999) constructs leadership styles from the answers to three questions: how do leaders react to the limitations of their environment?; how open are they to incoming information?; and what are the motivations that impel them to act politically? Depending on the answers to these questions, the leader’s manifest personal characteristics are delimited. The combination of these suggests different leadership styles that can determine the leader’s behavior when making foreign policy decisions.

This study uses two of the three personality dimensions proposed by Hermann (1999): level of openness to information, and motivation. Those authors who base leadership style on the degree of openness to information make the hypothesis that some personality traits, such as a distorted view of reality and excess self-confidence, increase leaders’ willingness to accept risks and, as a result, the possibility that conflicts will be triggered or prolonged and negotiated solutions prevented (Byman and Pollack 2001). The studies by Burke and Greenstein (1991), Hermann and Preston (1994), Conway et al. (2001, 2003), and Dyson (2009b) lead the field in this area.

Academics who give emphasis to motivation-related traits defend the idea that political leaders whose actions are motivated by identification with a group and distrust of other groups have a belief system that reduces their critical capacity and makes them more willing to accept risks and generate conflicts, which simultaneously influences the way in which they formulate government policies (Walker 1990; Byman and Pollack 2001). In contrast, those that give precedence to resolving common problems are more likely to resort to dialogue and negotiation (Hermann 1999). A first group of authors (George 1969; Walker 1977, 1990; Schafer and Walker 2006) adopt the operational code approach to explain the relationship between leaders’ motivational beliefs and their policy-formulating behavior. A second group of academics, led by Winter (1973, 1991), focus more on a business-like leadership style and employ the experimental technique of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), which is very difficult to apply to professional politicians.

HISTORICAL-BIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT

After the assassination of the first Chechen president, Dzhokhar Dudayev, in April 1996, and after months of interim leadership by the Islamic poet Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Aslan Maskhadov, a former Soviet commander, became head of state of the ChRI. In January 1997, Maskhadov defeated his opponents (among them, Yandarbiyev and Shamil Basayev, the guerrilla fighter) with 63.6 percent of the votes (Orttung 2000) in elections monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and approximately 70 international observers (Stern and Druckman 2000). The overwhelming victory legitimated a particular national project—the continuation of secular nationalism over radical Islamism (Russell 2011; Rigi 2012)—and it meant a direct mandate to lead the peace of the postwar era.

This peace process had been formalized months before, in August 1996, with the signing of the Khasavyurt agreement by Maskhadov and the Russian vice president, Alexander Lebed. This was not only the cessation of the military operations of the first Chechen war, but also a symbol of the de facto independence of the North Caucasian territory. The signatories:

Proceeding from the universally recognized right of peoples to self-determination, the principles of equality, voluntary and free expression of will, strengthening interethnic accord and the security of peoples, …

Have jointly developed Principles concerning mutual relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, on the basis of which the future negotiation process will be conducted.9

In May 1997, bilateral agreements that officially recognized Maskhadov as president of the ChRI were signed in Moscow by Maskhadov and Boris Yeltsin, completing the Russian–Chechen rapprochement.

Immediately after the first Chechen war, and as electoral results show, Aslan Maskhadov’s popularity was high thanks to, among other reasons, policies that aimed at the consolidation of a national state (Coggins 2014), his ability to negotiate with Moscow (Trenin, Malashenko, and Lieven 2004), and his previous military successes as chief of staff of the Chechen forces (Pain 2000). However, a phenomenon that has been called “North Caucasian neo-Islamization” began to alter this scenario. Many reasons and points of view have been offered in explanation of this change, including the regional prominence of jihadist organizations such as al-Qaeda (Bodansky 2007); the Salafist penetration of Dagestan (McGregor 2012) and its spread to Chechnya (Roshchin 2012); the new religious doctrine’s appeal to youths because it questioned patriarchal authority and linked up with the idea of struggle for liberation (Larzilliére 2007); socioeconomic impoverishment (Moore and Tumelty 2009); Moscow’s inability to create a satisfied Muslim civil society (Dannreuther 2010) and to collaborate with moderate sectors (Wilhelmsen 2005); and the disastrous sociopolitical, economic, and migratory consequences of the first Chechen war (Gammer 2005; Souleimanov 2005; Hahn 2007; Hughes 2007a).
Whether these arguments are substantiated or not (it is not this paper’s purpose to delve into them), it can be proven that among the main national imaginaries of the former Chechnya—according to Campana (2006) they can be grouped together as the separatists, the radical Islamists, the traditionalists, and the pro-Russians—the one that considered Sunni religiosity and stricter methodologies (fiqh) and schools of law (madhab) as the basis of the state, began a new hegemony.

The debate between secular constitutionalism and divine law was not new in Chechnya. Dzhokhar Dudayev, who years before had managed the Islamic issue with an effective and strategic ambiguity (Tishkov 2004), reconciled the two visions by assuring his countrymen that they should place “our souls in order according to the Qur’an, and our lives according to the Constitution” (Abubakarbo 1998, 34). However, in the late nineties the correlation of forces was different, especially during the second Chechen war. In this context Maskhadov, probably under pressure from the new reality and harassed by the continuous criticism of some increasingly strengthened Islamist groups (Le Huérou et al. 2014), began to make concessions to Islam and, in a risky maneuver, approved of the introduction of sharia in the Chechen judicial order.10

To the gradual Islamization of the institutions—a reflection of what was happening in Chechen society—must be added the inability of the government to achieve the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory (Sagranoso 2007). This enabled the constant activity of organized crime and Islamist guerrilla groups, culminating in the invasion of Dagestan in 1999; the hostage crisis at the Dubrovka theater in Moscow in 2002; the high-profile assassination of pro-Russian leader Akhmad Kadyrov in 2004; and in the same year, the massacre at Beslan school. All were planned and carried out without Maskhadov’s involvement. Although Moscow and some investigators (Davis and Ware 2003) maintain that these events were attributable in part to the alleged complicity and radicalization of the former president, it should be noted that they were due to strategic error and to structural and personal shortcomings in maintaining internal public order (IISS 1999).

This is at least suggested by his public statements, which were always contrary to the guerrilla modus operandi (Hunter 2004; Henkin 2006), and evidenced by his raids against religious extremists in the late nineties (Baisaev 2008).

The concessions granted to the Islamic movement (Henkin 2006; Hahn 2008), the difficulty of keeping Chechen armed activity under control despite his efforts (Galeotti 2002), socioeconomic problems (Glinkina and Rosenberg 2003), and the harassment campaign orchestrated by the Kremlin (Campana and Légaré 2010), offer an image of Maskhadov as a weak leader (Davis and Ware 2003; de Waal 2003; Lansky 2003; Matveeva 2007; George 2009). Moreover, due to the start of the second Chechen war in 1999, and because the guerrillas presented themselves as the vanguard of the Chechen resistance, Maskhadov, paradoxically, “employed Islamist rhetoric instrumentally to mobilize the population and inspire them to war against Russia, but the war itself empowered radical leaders with more serious Islamist aspirations” (Garner 2013, 421).

Immersed in a war that escaped his control and with a palpable loss of authority, Aslan Maskhadov was assassinated by the Russian security service (FSB) on March 8, 2005. Precisely in his worst moment as a leader, he became a mythical figure. “In death Maskhadov has gained a newfound popularity: his death in battle automatically bestows upon him the title of Shahid, a fighter for Allah’s righteousness, a defender of Chechen homeland” (Layton 2014, 46).

The death of Maskhadov had great political significance “because he was the only important opposition leader who still clung to the ideals of the Chechen nationalist struggle more so than the pan-Islamic, Salafi ideology favored by others” (Whitmeyer 2015, 33). With democratic elections suspended until the end of the war, he was succeeded by the then head of the supreme Sharia Court, Abdul-Halim Sadulayev, who, despite having publicly expressed some tactical and strategic disagreements with the insurgent leader Shamil Basayev and other guerrilla organizations,11 deepened the Islamization of the institutions and integrated the charismatic commander into the government in what some have seen as a duumvirate (Hahn 2008). In addition, they created the Caucasus Front, a pan-Caucasian military unit that assembled a greater part of the jamaats (Islamic guerrilla groups) under the leadership of Basayev, but that, contrary to the Maskhadov period, was structurally linked with the ChRI (Russell 2009a).

Sadulayev was assassinated in June 2006, just over a year into his presidency, and a month later Basayev fell in combat. With the deaths of the most significant Chechen actors in the conflict so far, Doku Umarov, an ethnic Chechen from the Mulkoy teip (clan), was named fifth president of the ChRI on June 17, 2006. Umarov had a higher level of education, having studied construction engineering at the Oil Institute in Grozny. He had an extensive guerrilla history during the first and second Chechen wars, as well as administrative experience in government since he had held several positions, including as president of the Security Council of the ChRI and, later on, as vice president of the government. His involvement in the different administrations of the republic and in the guerrilla forces initially suggested that the Umarov transition might be an excellent opportunity to reconcile the nationalist factions and the Sufi Islamists with the jihadists, after years of open dispute since the end of the first post-Soviet war. In fact,

there was a consensus among observers that Umarov would continue to uphold the broad political line established by his predecessors by continuing to fight for an independent Chechnya. Umarov’s 2005 interview with [Radio Liberty correspondent Andrei] Babitsky had persuaded most
observers that the new president was essentially a Chechen nationalist, who felt no great enthusiasm for radical Islam (Leahy 2010, 264).

Nevertheless, this expectation turned out to be unfounded, as Umarov maintained “the Islamist element in his ideological pronouncements and provoked a final break with the moderate Sufis and nationalists with his October 2007 declaration of a ‘Caucasus Emirate’ and jihad against all those who were fighting Muslims around the globe” (Hahn 2008, 16). Regarding such statements, his language “was markedly different from previous Chechen political leaders, and from [his] previous statements in interviews.” Furthermore, “the vocabulary of the struggle had become Arabized, that is to say the influence of Salafi ideology affected the very words used to refer to the struggle” (Whitmeyer 2015, 34).

The Caucasus Emirate consolidated the unification of all the guerrillas, which Sadulayev had previously attempted by creating the Caucasus Front; far from reducing armed actions, they increased. From 2007 onward the CE significantly increased the attacks and permanently expanded the confrontation to Dagestan and Ingushetia (Schaefer 2010). Similarly, it modified the position and architecture of the Chechen “state,” considering it as a vilayat (province) of the CE, which since its creation “is mostly a nominal entity represented by insurgent forces rather than a regular political establishment and territory” (Baskan 2012, 87). That was the breaking point between the Islamic and the nationalist secular movements; the latter considered itself the rightful heir of the old ChRI. Akhmed Zakayev, hitherto deputy prime minister of the ChRI, who continued on the political path set out by Dudayev and Maskhadov and who, since 2002, has been a refugee in the United Kingdom, labeled Umarov’s declaration a “crime” and called on the senior ranks of the military establishment to rebel against the new emir. However, the edict did not have a good reception, and Umarov, in a clear reference to Zakayev’s exile, forbade his followers to collaborate with the infidels and the West (Schaefer 2010). Since then, the ChRI has been no more than an organization that, for symbolic and propaganda purposes, proclaims itself the legitimate government in exile, but maintains little control over what happens in Chechnya.

The fight with Zakayev was not the only one Umarov had to suffer. On August 1, 2010, and in a mysterious and unexpected manner, the Russian, Western, and CE-linked media released a video in which the emir appeared next to the guerrilla fighter Aslambek Vadalov and other of his partners. In it, the Chechen leader appeared to renounce his post and appoint Vadalov as successor. Three days later this was denied by Umarov himself in two videos that were released by the propaganda apparatus of the CE. In them he claimed that his renunciation was “fabricated,” and accused Muhammed, leader of the Arab mujahedeen in Chechnya (Saradzhyan 2010). This situation led to a schism among the members of the CE, although the upper ranks remained loyal to Umarov. Prominent figures such as the then wali (governor) of the Vilayat Nokchicho (Chechnya) Khuseyn Gakayev, the chief of the Raisa Mukhabarat (secret service) Tarkhan Gaziyev, and Muhammed and Vadalov, released a new video in which they rejected Umarov’s “authoritarian” leadership and his “unilateral” pan-Caucasian policy, and proclaimed Gakayev new emir of Chechnya (Jamestown Foundation 2010). This division was a hard blow for Umarov, because the moderation and the return to nationalism that the dissidents promised drew many rank and file (Vatchagaev 2011), and it also brought a breath of fresh air for the ChRI government in exile. However, after almost a year of infighting—in which among other things Muhammed would fall in combat—Zakayev’s hope of seeing an ally in Gakayev dissipated (Bordei 2012) due to the CE’s Sharia Court ruling in favor of Umarov, which legitimized his sole leadership. As a counterstroke, Umarov restructured the military apparatus by creating new military districts and relocating wayward guerrillas in them.15

After eighteen months of undisputed leadership, Umarov was poisoned by the FSB in the autumn of 2013, a deed that remained a secret until March 2014 when Aliaskhab Kebekov, an Avar native of Dagestan, was formally proclaimed the new emir of the CE.

ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW CONTENT AND POLICIES OF WAR AND PEACE

The assessment of leadership styles is carried out by measuring certain personal characteristics of political leaders. In order to do that, different techniques can be used: questionnaires, interviews, participatory observation, content analysis, biographical statistics, or simulation (Hermann 1977). Content analysis is a research technique that objectively and systematically describes the “manifest content of communication” (Razin and Lazarfeld 1948). It can be quantitative or qualitative. Qualitative content analysis conducts a detailed examination of the material from someone but does not conduct a counting process (Hermann 1977). Quantitative analysis “directly accesses the meaning of the different segments that make up the text without considering the textual material itself,” and is performed in two stages: first, a set of categories (words, set of words, phrases, etc.) is defined, and then the times that they appear in the analyzed text are identified and counted (Lebart et al. 2000; Alonso et al. 2012). This technique must be reliable and hence replicable; if someone else uses the same rules and the same material, a similar result should be obtained (Alonso et al. 2012).

This article uses the technique of quantitative content analysis, namely LTA, which assesses leadership styles
from certain personal characteristics. This methodological technique has been successful in terms of validity. The LTA content analysis has four phases: selecting the material, splitting the text into coding units, creating a classification system with dimensions and categories, and counting and presenting the results.

The materials on which content analysis is performed are interviews. Two types of interviews in research on political leaders are distinguished; the research interview and the acquired interview. In the first one, the researcher conducts a deep interview with the political leader, so he has greater control over the issues, questions, and answers; however, in this type of interview the leader shows a greater tendency to maintain a certain type of ideal image. The acquired interview is performed by an interviewer outside the research, primarily by a media corporation; in these types of interviews the researcher does not control the topics to be addressed but has the advantage that he or she usually has more material and, above all, does not require the cooperation of the political leader (Hermann 1977).

In this paper, we analyze answers from acquired interviews from a database that includes a sample of 317 interviews with 69 world political leaders between 1979 and 2015, taken from diverse media (newspapers, radio, and television) as well as from other secondary sources (academic interviews, foundations, non-governmental organizations, websites). Along with the interviews of Maskhadov and Umarov, it is necessary to include a significant number of leaders in the database for comparison, in each category, of the average of leaders under analysis with the total averages.

In content analysis there is not a general rule for the amount of material to be selected, but it depends on the research question (Alonso et al. 2012, 16). As regards the material selected, a number of rules have to be followed. First, in assessing a leader’s style, three interviews in question–answer format must be used, the answers to which have to total between 7,000 and 15,000 words in length. Second, owing to the nature of the technique employed, the selection of material need not be random or meet statistical representativeness criteria (Fernández 2002). Third, the material must come from different countries and political entities, regardless of the context, with a view to calculating an average total in order to simplify the counting. Fourth, all the interviews must be in English or translated into that language.

Coding units are linguistic elements that are quantified in each of the categories and dimensions of the content analysis. There are three types of units: words and groups of words (compound words); sentences and partial sentences; and complete texts. The LTA technique counts words and groups of words. When coding the words and groups of words in each category, their meaning in the text, sentence, or partial sentence is taken into account.

Using Herman (1999) as a reference, the coding system is structured on five exclusive categories grouped into two dimensions. The first dimension tries to define the leader’s degree of openness to information flows, and consists of two categories for coding units (words and groups of words) that indicate the leader’s degree of conceptual complexity and those that guide his degree of self-confidence. The second dimension evaluates the leader’s motivation type, and contains three categories: words (verb forms) indicating the leader’s tendency to solve problems; words and groups of words that suggest sympathy and the leader’s identification to certain groups; and words expressing the leader’s distrust to certain groups.

The leader’s degree of openness to information flows is a personality dimension of political leaders. Following Hermann (1999), it is comprised by two categories. The first is conceptual complexity, which indicates the degree to which individuals classify objects and ideas and react to external stimuli; the individual who lacks it classifies everything by polarizing parameters and is less flexible to stimuli and situations principles. The second category is self-confidence, which represents the idea an individual has about his/her ability to properly cope with and interact with objects and people within his or her environment. The leader’s motivation is defined by three categories that match two of the leader’s main functions within the group: guide him toward resolving problems and keeping the group together. Leaders with a tendency to solve problems exert their leadership to meet specific objectives. Leaders focused on the group seek to maintain the cohesiveness of the latter (i.e., people, nation-country, region, social class) by extolling their virtues and/or generating distrust toward other groups (i.e., empires, other countries, terrorists).

In addition to the aforementioned groups and categories, in order to assess leadership styles, Hermann (1999) uses another dimension—the leader’s reaction to his environment’s limitations—which consists of two categories: the environment control belief and the need for power and influence. In this study, these categories are not considered for several reasons. First, unlike the other four dimensions, these are categories that are treated as phrases or partly completed phrases rather than words or groups of words, which complicates objective measurement and their integration with other categories for the classification of leadership styles. Second, the environment control belief is already measured in some sense by the self-confidence category. Finally, the second category excluded from the analysis presents complications in its measurement and it is also hard to imagine leaders lacking ambition and need for power and influence.

Once the categories of each leader are delimitated, his or her leadership style is defined. The leadership styles typology proposed by Hermann (1999) is designed for studies on decision making in foreign policy matters and not for decisions about war and peace in contexts of armed conflict. Therefore, a typology is constructed in terms of the possible combinations of categories resulting from the content
Leadership styles

Troubleshooter
Self-assured
Suspicious

TABLE 1
Categories and Leadership Styles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Leadership styles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of conceptual complexity</td>
<td>Manichean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-confidence</td>
<td>Self-assured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendency to solve problems</td>
<td>Troubleshooter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with groups</td>
<td>Umbrella</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust of other groups</td>
<td>Suspicious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Compiled from Hermann (1986, 1999) and Lasswell (1963).

All proposed leadership styles are compatible in a single leader except the administrator style, which is exclusive, given that a leader can only have that leadership style when he lacks all the features that define the other leadership styles.

In the last phase of content analysis, the words or expressions that belong to each category (Table 2) are identified and the times that they appear in every interview are analyzed and counted. The counting of the categories “identification with groups” and “distrust” takes into account the meaning of words in the analyzed responses. After quantification, in a third phase, the frequency with which words or phrases are repeated in each category of each of the interviews is calculated. The frequencies are calculated as a percentage. The last phase of the analysis determines which characteristics (measured by each category) leaders have by the following formula: \( X \) leader - \( \bar{X} \) total >\( \sigma \); that is, a leader has a category when the difference between the leader’s average percentage and the total average percentage is greater than the standard deviation within that category. The criteria proposed by Hermann (1999, 32) have proven reliable and have been used successfully in various academic works to assess leadership styles (Dyson 2009b; Hermann and Sakiev 2011; Keller and Foster 2012; Foster and Keller 2014).

To ensure the reliability of the method, we have created a codification manual that contains the rules and standards that must be followed to replicate the results (Table 3). The word count has been replicated by three independent researchers: the first obtained correlations of 0.98 (Umarov) and 1.00 (Maskhadov); the second, 0.79 (Umarov) and 1.00 (Maskhadov); and the third, 0.96 (Umarov) and 0.88 (Maskhadov).

Having described the operation of the LTA content analysis, we examine the policies of war and peace made by the leaders in an armed conflict. As already mentioned, there are two types of policies in the context of armed conflicts: war policies and peace policies. There are two important differences between the two types of policies. First of all, the former are an autonomous decision of the leader while the latter are the result of agreement between the parties within a framework of a dialogue or peace process. Second, the war policies that can be adopted by executive leaders are different from those that may be developed by unrecognized or insurgent leaders; nonetheless, peace policies may be agreed between them, and therefore they are the same. Due to the fact that in this case we are analyzing two unrecognized executive leaders, policy types in similar wars are used. Both types of policies are possible dependent variables for future research; the case study will allow us to select one of them as such.

Table 4 includes ten war policies and eight peace policies that leaders can develop in an armed conflict. These are two categorical variables, and so their order does not necessarily

TABLE 2
Content Analysis: Dimensions, Categories, and Coding Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Coding units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of openness to information flows</td>
<td>Lack of conceptual complexity Words: Absolute, absolutely, definitely, doubt(less), certainly, full, fully, clearly, obvious, obviously, evident, completely, quite, surely, total, totally, irreversible, irrevocable, final, finally, I have no doubt, no doubt, without hesitation, of course, I’m sure, no turning back</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>Self-confidence</td>
<td>Words: I, my, myself, me, mine, confidence, conviction, I have been, a server, other self-references</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tendency to solve problems</td>
<td>Words (verb forms): to advance, to meet, to solve, to overcome, to resolve, to restore, to restructure, to strengthen, to negotiate, to defeat, to stop, to end, to finish, to terminate, to reduce, to prevent, to appeal, to accomplish, to achieve, to reach (goals), to transform, to propose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identification with groups</td>
<td>Positive words: people, nation, country, homeland, patriot, independence, identity, self-determination, sovereign, (supra)region, poor, humble, grassroots, religion group, God, Gospel, Bible, Jesus, Islam, Muslim, Allah, Koran, Sharia, Muhammad, social class (no middle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distrust of other groups</td>
<td>Words: enemy, terror, terrorist, terrorism, subversive, rebels, traitors, bandits, separatists, extremism, radicalism, totalitarianism, oligarchy, caste, criminal group, putsch, coup d’état, conspiracy, apostates, infidels (kafirs), murder, torture, genocide, massacre, extermination, dictatorship, authoritarian, slaughter, domination, destruction, bombs, bombing, disappearance, repression, forced displacement, kidnapping, threat, external threat, Islamism, fundamentalism, wahhabism, al-Qaeda, communism, chavism, fascism, Nazism, imperialism, empire, imperial, superpower, WMD, chemical/nuclear weapons, occupation, occupants, invaders, colonial and other derogatory reference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Hermann (1999).
correspond to a greater intensity degree of negotiation or confrontation.

In order to compare styles and policies, we identify policies of war and peace that were carried out by Maskhadov and Umarov, and these are compared against the respective leadership styles. Finally, different leaders from countries in a context of armed conflict are compared to look for signs and build hypotheses.

**TABLE 3**

Rules and Regulations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rules</th>
<th>Regulations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Applicable to any type of executive leader, belonging to the opposition or insurgent, in any context or historical period.</td>
<td>1. Three or more interviews of each leader, whose answers add up to any number between 7,000 and 15,000 words must be included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. All or only some of the characteristics proposed as analytical categories can be evaluated.</td>
<td>2. The interviews must be in Q&amp;A format.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Does not admit any material different from the interview; acquired interviews are analyzed; but investigation interviews can also be used.</td>
<td>3. The interviews must have three or more Q&amp;A’s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The proposed leadership styles in function of the analytical categories are not exclusively limited to contexts of armed conflict.</td>
<td>4. The interviews that are utilized to evaluate a leader cannot belong to the same media outlet, at least one of them must be of a different media outlet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The sample is not representative; a high number of leaders can be included in order to obtain a total average with which the frequency of each category can be obtained.</td>
<td>5. The word count limits itself exclusively to the proposed units of quantification (words or groups of words).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The format of the interviews is not relevant in the analysis.</td>
<td>6. In the word count, the meaning of the words and the groups of the words inside the phrase, must be taken into account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The averages are calculated in percentages (%), although different denominators can be applied.</td>
<td>7. The average is calculated by taking into account the number of words in each answer given by the leader and not by the total number of words in the interview.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. All categories are inclusive, compatible in one single leader. Each proposed category implies a different leadership style. When a leader does not have any of the characteristics measured by the analytical categories, he is classified as an administrator, the only style that excludes the rest.</td>
<td>8. A leader has an analytical category when the result of the difference between the average belonging to the leader and the total average is more than half of the standard deviation of said category ( (\bar{X} \text{ leader} - \bar{X} \text{ total}) &gt; \sigma ).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4**

War and Peace Policies of Leaders in Armed Conflict Contexts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic operations that are not intended to inflict casualties</td>
<td>Proposing neutral mediators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special criminal laws and national security programs</td>
<td>Proposing dialogues or peace process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banning political parties linked to the enemy</td>
<td>Prisoner exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting special taxes</td>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical deployment of army and/or security forces</td>
<td>Proposing agreements of political, social, or economic content between the parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration of state of emergency or siege</td>
<td>Definitive cessation of armed struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlawful activities to self-financing (drugs, arms, or women trafficking)</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military operations</td>
<td>Compliance of transitional justice, reparation for victims, and guarantees for political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced recruitment and/or forced displacement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal and extrajudicial executions and kidnapping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEADERSHIP STYLE IN THE CONTEXT OF ARMED CONFLICT**

In this section, first, the results of the content analysis are collected to classify the leaders Maskhadov and Umarov according to their leadership styles; second, policies of war and peace of both leaders are exposed, examined, and compared; finally, leadership styles and policies of these leaders are contrasted with others to look for clues regarding the relationship between the two variables and to build hypotheses for future research.

The content analysis of responses has allowed the classification of leaders according to leadership styles. Out of the 69 leaders included in the database, 41 have the administrator style, 10 have the troubleshooter style, 4 are suspicious, 4 are Manichean, 4 are self-assured, and 2 are umbrella; the other 4 leaders share different leadership styles. The troubleshooter style is repeated 12 times, the suspicious 7, the Manichean 5, the self-assured 5 times, and the umbrella 3.
TABLE 5
Results of LTA Content Analysis: Maskhadov and Umarov

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Database</th>
<th>Aslan Maskhadov</th>
<th>Doku Umarov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of interviews</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of answered words</td>
<td>707,940</td>
<td>11,068</td>
<td>11,964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total average</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Leader’s average – Total average</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Leader’s average – Total average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of conceptual complexity (Manichean)</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-confidence (Self-assured)</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendency to solve problems (Troubleshooter)</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.35*</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with groups (Umbrella)</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>2.87*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust (Suspicious)</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.53*</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.48*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Leadership style**
- Troubleshooter, suspicious
- Umbrella, suspicious

* $\bar{X}$ leader – $\bar{X}$ total-$\sigma$

Values in percentages (%)
TABLE 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Maskhadov</th>
<th>Umarov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic operations that are not intended to inflict casualties</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special criminal laws and national security programs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banning political parties linked to the enemy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting special taxes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical deployment of army and/or security forces</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration of state of emergency or siege</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlawful activities to self-financing (drugs, arms, or women trafficking)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military operations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced recruitment and/or forced displacement</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal and extrajudicial executions and kidnapping</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of the LTA content analysis of Maskhadov and Umarov are shown in Table 5. The second president of the ChRI is average in the categories that measure the degree of openness to information flows, 0.03 above average points in lack of conceptual complexity, and 0.63 above average points in self-confidence. Maskhadov’s results in the categories of motivation are the highest in relation to the average; identification with groups is 0.72, 0.39 above average points, but the difference between the average and the total average leader is not above the standard deviation, a tendency to solve problems is 0.85, 0.35 above average points, and distrust is 0.80, 0.53 above average points. Based on these results, Maskhadov can be classified as troubleshooter and suspicious leader.

Umarov has very different results. The Chechen leader shows poor results in the categories relating to degree of openness to information flows; the lack of conceptual complexity is around the average with a score just 0.02 points lower, while self-confidence is 1.16 percent, 1.02 points below the average. In the motivation category, the results indicate that the Chechen leader was oriented toward the group and not to problem resolution. The tendency to solve problems is located 0.16 points below the average; the distrust result is 0.48 points higher than average; and group identification is 3.20 percent, a figure that exceeded the average by 2.87 points. Umarov’s result for identifying with the group is the highest of the 69 leaders gathered in the database. In the group identification and distrust categories, the average difference is significantly above the standard deviation. According to these results, the leadership styles of this Chechen leader are suspicious. Maskhadov and Umarov are both suspicious leaders. All of the suspicious leaders in the database (Maskhadov, Umarov, Dudayev, Kadyrov, Uribe, Gaddafi, and Al-Assad) are leaders of countries in an armed conflict.

Once the leadership styles of Maskhadov and Umarov are determined, we proceed to examine the policies of both leaders in terms of war and peace in a context of armed conflict during the period analyzed. As shown in Tables 6 and 7, Maskhadov developed various war policies that have already been defined. However, an observation must be made: given the complexities and intrigues of this tumultuous period sometimes it is difficult to know which actions have been carried out by Islamist guerrillas, which by the government of the ChRI, and which jointly. Even though the Khasavyurt agreement promised a happy outcome for Russia–Chechen relations, there are serious indications that Moscow did not try hard enough to fulfill the treaty (Said 2007; Shedd 2008). This situation sustained the tensions between the two, thus provoking a prewar atmosphere that would ultimately lead to war in 1999. In this context, Maskhadov responded Russia’s non-compliance with symbolic operations such as withdrawing all government funds from Russian banks (Bennigsen 1999). However, most of the actions prior to open military conflict centered on containing the overwhelming influence of Islamist groups, such as the declaration of a state of emergency in 1998 (Galeotti 2014; Pokalova 2015). Thus, common war policies in the period of escalation—such as the tactical deployment of troops, the approval of special security laws, or prohibition of enemy political parties and associations—had as their intended target the wahhabists and not the Russians.

Maskhadov, after direct confrontations began and martial law was decreed (Askerov 2015), personally led the defense of Grozny until the withdrawal into the mountains in 2000, and only then did the president decide to adopt a strategy of guerrilla warfare (Sagramoso 2012; Akhmadov and Daniloff 2013; Dowling 2015). In addition, there is proof that, at minimum, he supported sabotage (Ware 2005) against Russian civilians, such as the June 2004 attack on the town of Nazran in the Republic of Ingushetia (Jeffries 2011; Pokalova 2015). A month before the attack, and in connection with the assassination of Akhmad Kadyrov, Maskhadov threatened that any other pro-Russian “Chechen president” could suffer the same fate (Russell 2008).

However, Maskhadov did not implement some war policies, he opposed them. In this sense, during this
period there are no known extortions or revolutionary taxes levied on the Chechen or Russian populations by the ChRI government, and its economic policy was focused on rebuilding the big cities devastated by the first conflict, rather than levying taxes for the war effort. Similarly, there are no reliable sources that point to illegal financing or to the forced displacement of North Caucasian ethnic Russians; rather, some sources point to the fact that Maskhadov—unsuccessfully—implemented policies against organized crime, the main culprit in the extortion of ethnic Russians (Sokirianskaya 2014).

If we can distinguish Maskhadov from Umarov, it is because the former knew how to implement different peace policies. During the interwar period Maskhadov tried to establish diverse agreements of a social and economic nature with Russia as part of the Khasavyurt agreements. Some of these initiatives were unsuccessful (Maskhadov 2000) but others were finally signed, such as the “Peace Treaty and Principles of Interrelation Between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria”26 in 1997. However, as mentioned, several factors—not all attributable to Maskhadov—triggered a second armed conflict, which from the very beginning was undesired by the former Chechen leader. Indeed, a few days into armed hostilities—and in the following months and years—Maskhadov asked the international community to achieve a peaceful solution (Kadiev 2003; Draganova 2005; Akhadov and Daniloff 2013).

Maskhadov’s commitment to peace grew intermittently, perhaps influenced by the premonition of a likely defeat and without abandoning the mentioned war policies. Thus, having surpassed the stage of international arbitration requests, he requested direct27 bilateral dialogue with Russia without preconditions (Kadiev 2003), something he would sustain up to a few days before his assassination. In fact, Maskhadov declared a unilateral ceasefire days before his death in February 2005.

It [the ceasefire] is a gesture of good will, an attempt to demonstrate a commitment to peace and to call the Russian leadership to their senses. In my view, the processes occurring today in the Caucasus will lead to a catastrophe. In this situation, I consider it my duty to exert the maximum effort to turn away a real threat not only to my people but to all of the peoples of Russia and the Caucasus. . . . I believe that the political will of the presidents of Russia and of Ichkeria is able to bring an end to this bloody battle. Therefore my challenge is addressed first of all specifically to the president of Russia, and thereafter, of course, to all of those whose conscience is not completely degraded (Maskhadov 2008).

However, as on other occasions, the statement was not reciprocated by Putin, who for years had played on the frame of not negotiating with terrorists (Campana and Légaré 2010) by referencing, as the official version, Maskhadov’s participation in the Nord-Ost and Beslan attacks—an assertion that to this day has not been proven.

Umarov, meanwhile, implemented several of the war policies analyzed but not one of the peace policies. As has already been mentioned in the historical-biographical context, the creation of the CE in 2007 implied the organization of a new state, a reorganization of the territories, and a shift from mostly secular legislation to an omnipresent Islamic law. These changes appear to be in sync with the military needs of the movement, responding to a design of guerrilla warfare: on one hand, via the expansion of jihad to other territories by declaring a tactical deployment of the guerrillas to areas outside the North Caucasus, such as the Volga and the Urals (Hahn 2008); and on the other hand, via a cellular structure—similar to Daesh’s—that formally seems centralized, while in practice the provinces and military leaders have certain freedom of action (Markedonov 2011; Al-Shishani 2014).

As mentioned, one of the central novelties of the new state is the position of religion as the center of all activity. Thus, judicial bodies have been established to monitor compliance with Islamic precepts—always from a determined ideological condition—and they have also functioned as part of the war machine by enacting special laws to fight Russian or pro-Russian troops (Leahy 2010). Similarly, the particular brand of interpretation of Islam that the CE promotes serves as an alibi for the implementation of war policies aimed at the survival and safeguarding of the system. As noted, after the declaration of the CE in 2007, Umarov prohibited and persecuted allegiances to the ChRI government in exile, and those who maintained close relations with Ramzan Kadyrov’s government were accused of being collaborators. Thus, dissent was systematically linked to the enemy, thereby causing drastic consequences: in 2010 the qadi (Islamic judge) Davu condemned to death the guerrilla fighter Shamil Gasanov for alleged insubordination, and the sentence was carried out even before it was communicated to Gasanov; it is worth mentioning that years later the sentence was declared null and his honor was posthumously restored (Hahn 2014).

### Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Leadership styles</th>
<th>Peace policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aslan Maskhadov</td>
<td>Troubleshooter, suspicious</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doku Umarov</td>
<td>Umbrella, suspicious</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzhokhar Dudayev</td>
<td>Troubleshooter, suspicious</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shamil Basayev</td>
<td>Umbrella</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranzam Kadyrov</td>
<td>Suspicious</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boris Yeltsin</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir Putin</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, although the early years of Umarov’s leadership did not generate many military operations or executions of civilians, both policies increased from 2009 on, when the Riyad-us Salihene Brigade of Martyrs was reactivated. This is a historic battalion that specialized in suicide attacks (Askerov 2015). Thus, apart from the attacks on authorities in Dagestan and Ingushetia, Umarov has been implicated in other attacks; some have been recognized by the organization, but others remain in doubt, such as the one against the Sayano-Shushenskaya power station in 2009, the attacks against the Nevsky Express train the same year, the explosion in the Moscow subway in 2010, and the suicide attack at Domodedovo airport in 2011 (Hedenskog 2011; Markedonov 2012, 2014). Also, despite being motivated by the protests against Vladimir Putin in Moscow’s Red Square in 2012 to declare a partial ceasefire on Russian civilians (Rekawec 2014), in the months preceding the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, Umarov harangued his followers to impede the event (Delanoë 2014). The radicalism with which dissent is treated in the CE’s areas of influence and the spiral of violence in the region have forced a large group of North Caucasians to migrate to other areas of Russia or abroad (Walicli 2008).

Some of the most controversial aspects—those that may have influenced the number of displaced persons—are related to the CE’s financing methods. In addition to donations, standard practices have charged a sort of revolutionary tax or extorted local residents and establishments (Aliyev 2013). Similarly, the illicit origins of their financial capital have been denounced in connection with other armed political organizations (Hahn 2011) and criminal groups that come from the narcotics trade (Hahn 2014); part of their weapons procurement is carried out by bribing armories and Russian soldiers (Al-Shishani 2014). Finally, other than the above-mentioned partial ceasefire, there are no peace policies that can be attributed to Umarov; the cease fire has not been included in the count for his management of the conflict due to the fact that it only covered a part of the “enemy” and it was broken by the CE itself.

DOES THE LEADERSHIP STYLE HAVE ANY INFLUENCE ON PEACE POLICIES? COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH OTHER LEADERS

Comparisons with other prominent actors will be made in order to verify whether, as in the case of Maskhadov, the troubleshooter leadership style is in some way related to the implementation of peace policies. First, we review the situation with regard to other leaders of the Russia–Chechen conflict; later we will focus on other contexts.

As can be observed in Table 8, it is obvious that the majority of leaders of the Russia–Chechen conflict, like Umarov, are leaders mainly oriented toward war policies.

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does the leadership style have any influence on peace policies? comparative analysis with other leaders

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an article submitted to The Washington Post that called for U.S. and German mediation, requested an unconditional ceasefire, and proposed direct negotiations with the Kremlin. He also agreed to a prisoner exchange with the Russians and signed an inconsequential peace agreement that contemplated a ceasefire and gradual disarmament (Mikaberizde 2011). The notable insight that can be drawn from the comparison of leaders of the Russia–Chechen conflict is that the two leaders that had a troubleshooter style were the ones that were most inclined toward peace policies. The rest, with the already mentioned exception of Yeltsin, were leaders who aimed mostly for war policies.

In addition, to broaden the perspective, Maskhadov’s and Umarov’s leadership styles are compared with other leaders in a context of armed conflict who aimed at peace policies; we also compare the leadership styles of the leaders inclined toward policies of war. This analysis allows us to construct hypotheses about which leadership styles are susceptible to negotiation and which leadership styles are less so.

Apart from the already mentioned Maskhadov and Dudayev, Table 9 includes twelve other leaders who have developed at least half of the defined peace policies as criteria to ensure a strong commitment to this form of conflict resolution. One of them, Mikhail Gorbachev, formalized the end of the Cold War, ordered the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and agreed to nuclear disarmament with the United States of America (Lundestad 2000; Malici 2009). Hashim Thaçi, despite his violent past as the leader of the Kosovar guerrillas, imposed a ceasefire on his men, participated in the Rambouillet peace conference, and in 1999 led the demobilization and disarmament of his group. Schaﬁk Handal led the Salvadorian guerrillas during the peace agreements and orchestrated their demobilization, disarmament, and conversion into a political party (Garcia 1993; Montobbio 1999). Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein, accepted international mediation and negotiated a ceasefire before commencing peace talks with the British government, which culminated in the Good Friday agreement of 1998. Arnaldo Otegi, pro-Basque independence leader, despite being imprisoned since 2009, was instrumental in initiating talks between the Spanish government and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), achieving truces, international mediation, and the renunciation of armed struggle in October 2011 (Eguiguren and Aizpeolea 2011).

In reference to Colombian leaders, Antonio Navarro Wolff was the lead negotiator for the M-19 guerrillas that were led by Carlos Pizarro, who finally demobilized and disarmed in the early 1990s during the presidential terms of Virgilio Barco and César Gaviria. Andres Pastrana’s first action as president-elect was to have a meeting in the jungle with the leader of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo (FARC–EP), Manuel Marulanda, which paved the way for the initiation of peace talks. Negotiations between Pastrana and Marulanda officially began in January 1999 and during this process, ultimately unsuccessful, several bilateral truces and agreements were reached (Vargas 2010). In August 2012, the Santos government and the FARC–EP, led by Timoléon Jiménez, signed an agreement that initiated a dialogue to end the armed conflict; between 2012 and 2015 they declared various unilateral and bilateral ceaseﬁres and reached partial agreements on agricultural development, political participation, and solutions to the drug problem. The chief negotiator of the FARC–EP is Iván Márquez.

It is worth highlighting that out of fourteen leaders included in Table 9, ten (71.4 percent) have a troubleshooter style like Maskhadov, against three administrators, two suspicious (also troubleshooters), and one manichean. None of these leaders has the self-assured or umbrella style. This comparison leads to the following hypothesis: In contexts of armed conflict, leaders with the troubleshooter leadership style tend to implement more peace policies.

Table 10 includes the leaders that mainly developed war policies in a context of armed conflict. Julio César Turbay and Margaret Thatcher are also included, besides the already mentioned Umarov, Basayev, Kadyrov, Yeltsin, and Putin. The former, the Colombian president from 1978 to 1982, opted for military solution, provided the armed forces with great autonomy, and restricted public freedoms and political participation rights through the Anti-Terrorist statute (Garcia Duran 1992). Although he created a peace commission, it had a short life and never exercised its negotiation faculties (Vargas 2010). Thatcher, known as the Iron Lady, who led the United Kingdom for more than twelve years, maintained a reluctant stance toward negotiations with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and initiated the Falklands war.

If you were to posit a hypothesis about the impact of leadership styles on peace policies in contexts of armed

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<th>Leader</th>
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<tr>
<td>Doku Umarov</td>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>Umbrella, suspicious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shamil Basayev</td>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>Umbrella</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranzam Kadyrov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boris Yeltsin</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
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<td>Vladimir Putin</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
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<td>Margaret Thatcher</td>
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</tbody>
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Frequency of Leadership Styles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrators</th>
<th>42.9%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Umbrellas</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspicious</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manichean</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-assured</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troubleshooters</td>
<td>0%</td>
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

With regard to the application of LTA content analysis to classify leaders by leadership styles, it is a useful methodology for defining leadership styles and classifying leaders thereby. It also allows researchers to modulate them according to the research target, including or excluding the analytical categories and the development of different typologies. Regarding the analysis of Maskhadov’s and Umarov’s policies and actions, this study provides a simple methodology for the comparative analysis of war and peace policies implemented by leaders in a context of internal armed conflict. From this descriptive and exploratory case study, some interesting conclusions are drawn that can be useful for future empirical and comparative research.

However, the main contribution of this study is to provide arguments proving that the leadership style of each actor can determine the greater presence of peace policies, at least in the North Caucasian conflict. Although Maskadov and Umarov shared a suspicious style, as is common in leaders of conflicts, the former had a troubleshooter style and was more inclined toward peace policies than Umarov (umbrella). In addition, the comparison of the two to other leaders of the conflict reinforces this finding, since it was shown that Dudayev was the only leader who had a troubleshooter style and was also the only one who clearly opted for peace policies. Moreover, if either the Russian authorities or the international community have the will to achieve a lasting peace in the region—perhaps a risky assumption—it appears that weakening the leadership of actors who have a troubleshooter style, as the Russians did with Maskhadov (Russell 2006; Campana and Légaré 2010), is a strategic mistake. A preventive analysis of the leadership styles of the leaders in the conflict can give us insights about the possibility of achieving meaningful mutual understandings, and it proves that the physical elimination of leaders such as Dudayev or Maskhadov tills the soil for more violent elements such as Basayev and Umarov (Cohen 2005; Baev 2006; Hahn 2008; Souleimanov and Ditrych 2008; Morehouse 2015).

In addition, the comparative analysis of other world leaders in an armed conflict has helped to establish hypotheses and variables on the possible impact of leadership styles on peace policies implemented by executive, unrecognized, and insurgent leaders in the context of internal armed conflicts. Based on the results of the case study and comparison of leaders, two hypotheses are constructed for future research:

1. In contexts of armed conflict, leaders with the troubleshooter leadership style tend to implement more peace policies.
2. In contexts of armed conflict, leaders without the troubleshooter leadership style tend to implement more war policies.

In the future, we can expand the database to include a larger number of world political leaders in various areas and more leaders in contexts of armed conflict. Likewise, the construction of hypotheses in the case study makes it easier to implement wider (explanatory and comparative) research in order to determine the impact of leadership styles on policies developed in contexts of armed conflict and to corroborate or discard the validity of the posed hypotheses. Finally, in future research, independent or explanatory, structural and institutional variables should be included to complement the leadership styles.

NOTES

1. The causal link between discourse and political decisions has been established in other works, such as those by Dyson (2006, 2009a), in which Tony Blair’s speech is measured according to the Leadership Trait Analysis method (LTA) to explain his decision to intervene in Iraq.
2. The Oxford dictionary defines leadership as “leading role.” The first meaning of leader, in the same dictionary, says: “The person who leads or commands a group, organization, or country.”
3. These individuals may have authority at all government levels (local, state, regional, national), in internationally recognized parallel or de facto governments, or within armed insurgent or guerrilla groups; and can achieve their position by popular election, appointment, revolution, war, or coup (Hermann 1977).
4. Three groups of children were organized who met after school to do their homework, and each group had a leader who had been prepared by the researchers to interpret different leadership styles; autocratic, liberal, and democratic. The groups alternated leaders with different styles. The autocratic one made all decisions in the group, the liberal one gave complete freedom to the group to make decisions, and the democratic one encouraged and supported the group to make decisions and looked more effective.
5. Unlike interviews, speeches lack spontaneity as they are prepared in advance and, in most cases, are not even written by the political leader but by his advisors or speechwriters (Hermann 1999).
6. The heads of modern states are usually commanders of the armed forces and often have the final say in matters of war and peace.
7. The decision to exclude Hermann’s first trait from the assessment of leadership styles is justified later in the article when we analyze the interview content.

8. The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) is used to assess leadership styles by taking account of motivational factors (see Winter 1991).

9. This version of the agreement and other related documents—such as the formalization of the principles that would lay the foundations for future relations between Russia and Chechnya, among which was the 2001 deadline to find a formula for the coexistence of both parties in accordance to international law—can be found in http://peacemaker.un.org/russia-khasayvourdecleration96.


17. According to Hermann (1999), when comparing the leaders’ profiles obtained by this technique in some of his papers with profiles made by journalists and former government officials who had interacted with and observed these same leaders, a high correlation of 0.84, was obtained.

18. The database includes leaders from all states (even unrecognized) and autonomous regions, with and without internal armed conflict: Gerry Adams (Northern Ireland); Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Iran); Patricio Aylwin and Sebastián Piñera (Chile); Virgilio Barco, Jaime Bateman, Belisario Betancur, Alfonso Cano, Álvaro Fayad, César Gaviria, Timoleon Jiménez, Iván Márquez, Manuel Marulanda, Antonio Navarro Wolf, Tanja Nijmeijer, Andrés Pastrana, Manuel Pérez, Gustavo Petro, Carlos Pizarro, Nicolás Rodríguez, Ernesto Samper, Juan Manuel Santos, Jesús Santrich, Julio César Turbay, Álvaro Uribe (Colombia); Shamil Basayev, Dzhokhar Dudayev, Aslan Maskhadov, and Doku Umurov (Chechen Republic of Ichkeria); Chechnya; Shri Shibu, and Bia Ying-Jeu (Taiwan); Rafael Correa (Ecuador); Susana Díaz (Andalusia); Mauricio Funes, Tony Saca and Shafik Haldal (El Salvador); Muanmnr Gaddafi (Libya); Mikhail Gorbatchev (USSR); Hu Jin Tao and Xi Jinping (PRC); Juan José Ibarretxe and Arnaldo Otegi (Basque country); Pablo Iglesias, Mariano Rajoy, and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (Spain); Lech Kaczyński (Poland); Ramzan Kadyrov (Chechnya); Salva Kiir Mayardit (South Sudan); Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (Brazil); Artur Mas and Jordi Pujol (Catalonia); Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma (South Africa); José Mujica (Uruguay); Vladimir Putin and Boris Yeltsin (Russia); Alex Salmond (Scotland); Arnold Schwarzenegger (California); Mamnoon Singh (India); Horst Seehofer (Bavaria); Hashim Thaçi (Kosovo).

19. A stricter criterion is used here than in Hermann (1999), which recommends a minimum of 50 responses from interviews with at least 100 words. The criterion of three interviews of 7,000 to 12,000 words reinforces the reliability of the method in order to facilitate the comparison of leadership styles.

20. It is recognized that the use of translated interviews is a limitation of this study, although it has tried to take into account a large number of synonyms.

21. Thus, the two theories of content analysis are combined: the one on emphasis, which highlights the importance of the topic in the speech; and the theory of position, according to which the importance lies in the position that a particular topic has in speech (Alonso et al. 2012).

22. The majority of these works were published in prestigious journals.

23. In content analysis, the rules are guides on how to interpret the test outcomes while the regulations are requirements that must be met to achieve the expected results (Alonso et al. 2012, 65–66).

24. The following researchers took part in the reliability test: Juliana Galvis, Cristhian D. Gavilán, and Angélica M. Goelkel; members of the Research Group on Political Parties, National University of Colombia, directed by Dr. David Roll; Sara S. Galindo, Valentina Gaviria, and Camila N. Parra were designated as substitutes.

25. Umarov rates so high in the category identification with groups that, if he were excluded from the database, the average would drop from 0.33 to 0.27 and the standard deviation from 0.63 to 0.47. If Basayev were also excluded, the average would drop to 0.24 and the standard deviation to 0.33. Thus, some leaders such as Maskhadov, who did not score on identification with groups, would score with the current database.


28. For this reason he is not considered a troubleshooter leader.


30. The data without explicit references are obtained from the “Biographies of Political Leaders” database at the Barcelona Centre for Political Affairs (CIDOB), available at http://www.cidob.org/biografias_lideres_politicos.


32. No results for the Colombians Virgilio Barco and Timoleón Jimenez were included because, although they developed at least four peace policies, we do not have enough interviews to assess their leadership styles in accordance with the rules and regulations contained in the codification manual.

REFERENCES


